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ABSTRACT
The German system of codetermination contributes to the entrenchment of labor.
We show in a two-period model of project choice that entrenched labor leads to
underinvestment and overstaffing.  We provide empirical evidence that German
firms subject to codetermination with equal representation of workers on
supervisory boards during 1989-93 were, on average, overstaffed.  In addition,
the fraction of employees in codetermined firms has decreased over time.  The
expanded reach of codetermination during the mid-1970s therefore may have
contributed to the deterioration of German economic growth performance
beginning at about that time through underinvestment, overstaffing, and costly
migration of business activity away from firms subject to codetermination.
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CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, ENTRENCHED LABOR, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH
The German system of worker codetermination (Mitbestimmung) dates from the early
1950s, although its social, political, and economic roots reach far back into the 19
th century
(Kommission Mitbestimmung (Codetermination Committee), 1998, p. 29).  The system of
codetermination was greatly expanded during the 1970s (Kommission Mitbestimmung, 1998,
p. 21).  Most importantly, the 1976 Codetermination Act extended to a large number of firms the
right of employees to hold one half of the seats on the firm’s supervisory board.  The supervisory
board is the external (non-executive) board that must approve all major financing and investment
decisions proposed by the (internal) management board.
Codetermination is not the only form of legal protection enjoyed by German workers, but
it alone provides workers with guaranteed access to large firms’ supervisory boards.  Although
worker representatives on supervisory boards cannot outvote shareholder-elected board members,
their presence increases employees’ public visibility and, in extreme cases, allows them to create
procedural delays.  For example, drawn-out consultations—“logrolling”—could stall
restructuring efforts or inhibit takeover negotiations.
We analyze a two-period model of a firm facing an investment decision in each period.
The context is an economy with legally entrenched labor. The firm faces either high or low
demand for its product in the first period and similarly it will face either high or low demand in
the future (independent of the first-period state of demand).  The firm does not know the
second-period demand conditions when deciding on the scale of first-period operations.  That is,
the firm must make an investment decision in the first period, knowing that hiring decisions are
asymmetric in that incumbent labor in the second period does not oppose adding employees but
might oppose layoffs.“Corporate Governance, Entrenched Labor, and Economic Growth” – November 8, 2001
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Entrenched labor creates a hold-up problem.  That is, shareholders may suffer a loss in
the second period because labor cannot be dismissed easily even though demand for the firm’s
product is low.  Anticipating this, firms’ decisions may deviate from the first-best efficient
allocation of resources in the first period.  We model the hold-up problem by introducing
entrenched labor and uncertainty in the future demand conditions facing the firm.  It turns out that
if initial demand conditions are strong, depending on the firm’s technology and project
profitability, the firm either underinvests in the first period or is overstaffed in the second period,
on average.  That is, in a cross section of firms, codetermination causes underinvestment and
overstaffing.
To investigate the model’s prediction that codetermined firms tend to be overstaffed, we
examine wage and staffing levels in a large dataset covering 250 German firms during the
1989-93 period, about one half of which were subject to so-called 1976 codetermination (equal
representation of workers on supervisory boards).  We find that average wage levels
(standardized by sales per employee) are not unusual for equal-representation firms.  However,
staffing levels (again adjusted by sales) are indeed significantly higher on average for
codetermined firms.  This is consistent with the model’s prediction.
Over time, economic activity may migrate away from firms that face legislative
constraints, such as labor entrenched by codetermination (Jensen and Meckling, 1979).  If
codetermination added value to the firm, codetermination would emerge as a Coase solution in a
bargaining process between shareholders and labor.  The fact that structures like codetermination
have not been adopted by firms that were not required to do so indicates that its stipulations
represent binding constraints on action.  The loss of efficiency arising from codetermination that
is imposed on firms presumably makes them grow more slowly than firms not subject to its rules,
or to shrink outright.  The Codetermination Commission found that the “codetermination-free
zone” of the German economy indeed has grown over time, consistent with Jensen and“Corporate Governance, Entrenched Labor, and Economic Growth” – November 8, 2001
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Meckling’s prediction (Kommission Mitbestimmung, 1998, p. 27).  German firms subject to
codetermination also might represent attractive takeover targets for foreign firms if, by
transferring legal jurisdictions, some of the target firm’s operations or decision-making could
escape the reach of the codetermination laws, releasing latent economic value.
The presence of underinvestment and overstaffing problems in codetermined firms,
together with inefficiency-induced migration of economic activity away from firms subject to
codetermination, may be sufficient to detract from overall economic performance.  The growth
performance of the German economy deteriorated noticeably beginning in the 1970s in
comparison with the United States and Japan, although it is not obvious what caused the
deterioration.  Our results suggest that entrenched labor is a plausible candidate to explain at least
part of Germany’s slow economic growth in recent decades.
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN GERMANY
Several features of the German corporate world are noteworthy.  Like other countries on
the European continent, Germany’s equity market capitalization is low relative to GDP.  Bank
lending is a more important source of external finance in Germany than in some other advanced
economies.  Exchange-listed companies exhibit highly concentrated ownership structures and
high family ownership (see Franks and Mayer, 2000).
Worker codetermination is another important characteristic of German corporate
governance, giving a strong role to labor representatives in corporate decision-making.  Workers
in firms with more than five permanent employees have the right to form a works council, which
has far-reaching power on shop-floor issues concerning operations, health and safety, to name but
a few.  Corporations with more than 500 permanent employees are subject to codetermination at
the supervisory board level.  One third of the seats on the supervisory board go to labor
representatives.  Corporations with more than 2,000 employees must allocate one half of board“Corporate Governance, Entrenched Labor, and Economic Growth” – November 8, 2001
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seats to labor representatives.  The chairman, who is generally a shareholder representative,
controls a tie-breaking vote.
A MODEL OF ENTRENCHED LABOR
We study a representative firm’s investment decisions in a two-period model that
incorporates entrenched labor.  The model draws inspiration from Hart (1995) and Myers (2000),
both of whom abstract from many features of actual firms in order to highlight critical aspects of
corporate governance.  Our focus in this paper is how the bargaining power of labor at the
beginning of the second period, together with uncertainty about future demand conditions, can
create a hold-up problem.  We show that the hold-up problem affects the firm’s first-period
choice of investment intensity and its second-period staffing levels.
The firm is a contract between two groups of people, the shareholders (owners) and labor
(workers).  We assume that each group acts in a coordinated manner to further its own interests;
there are no conflicts within either group.  The shareholders purchase operating assets and hire
labor, creating the firm.  The firm produces a single product (“widgets,” which are the output of
the firm’s single “project”).  The firm may operate either at large or small scale in either period
by investing more or less in physical capital and hiring more or fewer workers, respectively, as
described further below.
At the beginning of each period, demand for widgets during that period becomes known.
Demand for widgets is either high or low.  If demand is low and the project is operated at large
scale, there is surplus output, which cannot be sold for any positive price.  If demand is high in
the first period, the shareholders pay Kh to buy the operating assets.  If demand is low, the
required initial investment is KK K ll h  ()  .  The labor input of the firm, L, is determined by a
Leontief production technology, L K =α  , where L is the number of employees.  The desired
number of workers are offered contracts on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis and all other workers“Corporate Governance, Entrenched Labor, and Economic Growth” – November 8, 2001
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remain outside the firm with no bargaining power or influence on the firm’s actions.  We assume
the employees work a fixed number of hours, which, along with the wage, w, is determined
outside the model.  These assumptions are meant to resemble Germany’s collective wage
bargaining arrangement (Flächentarifvertrag), which determines wages and standard weekly
work hours.  For simplicity, we assume that the wage is fixed for two periods:  ww w   01 .
Figure 1 illustrates the timing of important decisions in the model.
[Figure 1]
The only uncertainty in the model is whether demand for the widget in the second period
will be high or low.  If demand in the second period is high, the firm’s profit is maximized by
operating at large scale, (=  ,   = ) KK L K hh α  , whereas if second-period demand is low, the
optimal scale is small (=  ,   = ) KKL K ll α  .  For simplicity, we assume capital does not
depreciate.  Given optimal choice of physical capital and labor, the shareholders’ end-of-period
return after paying wages of w K ⋅⋅ α  turns out to be (1 )   κ r K, where r is the marginal
opportunity cost of capital and κ  is the project’s value added per unit of capital, or profitability.
Given ex ante uncertainty about second-period demand and the possibility of adjusting
production capacity (and labor input) at that time, there may be surplus (net income) over which
the shareholders and labor can bargain.  This is the essence of the hold-up problem:  labor may be
in a position to extract some or all of the surplus of the firm at the beginning of the second period.
We first discuss the case in which shareholders possess all bargaining power and then the case in
which labor has all the bargaining power.  Our interest is in the implications of labor bargaining
power for employment and investment.
Shareholders possess all bargaining power in the second period
We begin by assuming that shareholders possess all bargaining power at the beginning of
period two, when uncertainty is resolved and recontracting can occur.  In other words, labor is not“Corporate Governance, Entrenched Labor, and Economic Growth” – November 8, 2001
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entrenched and must accept any “take-it-or-leave-it” offer from shareholders.  At t0, the
beginning of the first period, first-period demand for widgets is revealed to all.  If demand is low,
the shareholders invest the amount Kl,0 to build the operating assets and hire the amount of labor
determined by the Leontief technology, α Kl,0.  This implies a wage bill at the end of the first
period equal to w Kl ⋅⋅ α ,0.  At t1, the beginning of the second period, the firm learns
second-period demand for widgets.  If demand remains low, the firm operates exactly as it did
during the first period.  The operating assets are liquidated and labor retires at the end of the
second period.  If, on the other hand, demand is high during the second period (after being low
during the first period), shareholders invest the additional amount K K h l −  at t 1 and hire
additional employees numbering α ⋅− () K K h l .
Now consider sequences in which demand is high in the first period.  If demand is high
during the second period, as well, the firm continues operating at large scale.  If demand turns out
to be low during the second period, then the firm at t 1 liquidates capital in the amount KK hl 
and lays off workers numbering α ⋅− () K K h l .  Because workers have no bargaining power, they
have no influence on the project size chosen at the beginning of the second period or on the level
of employment.  Thus, there is no path dependency in the model because the firm’s project choice
at the beginning of the first period has no bearing on investment at the beginning of the second
period.
Labor possesses all bargaining power in the second period
Now suppose labor is entrenched.  In our model, this means that workers make a
“take-it-or-leave-it” offer to shareholders at t 1, the beginning of the second period.  The
bargaining power of labor at t 1 is limited in several ways.  First, shareholders generally have the
right to liquidate the firm at t 1 and invest the proceeds, K, at the opportunity cost (the return on“Corporate Governance, Entrenched Labor, and Economic Growth” – November 8, 2001
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an outside investment) during the second period.  We assume the shareholders cannot liquidate
the firm at t 1 and immediately reestablish it with a new workforce.  If shareholders could
undertake such sham reorganizations, labor of course would have no bargaining power.
Second, labor’s bargaining power extends only to matters that are negotiable.  We
assume the wage rate and hours of work are determined outside the model through an
industry-wide collective bargaining agreement, so the only negotiable matter is second-period
layoffs.  Incumbent workers are represented on the supervisory board (rather than potential new
workers), so the only time labor uses its bargaining power is when shareholders want to
downsize.  If demand for the widget in the second period remains unchanged (at either the high or
low level), the shareholders propose no changes and consequently there are no negotiations.
Similarly, when demand increases from low to high, labor has no incentive to resist expansion
because the newly hired workforce does not affect the income of the incumbents.  Bargaining
occurs only when demand drops from high to low because firm’s profit-maximizing workforce
drops by the amount  α ⋅− () K K h l  to the reduced level of α Kl.
We assume that labor suffers a loss if laid off; otherwise, labor has no incentive to
bargain.  The loss might be due to switching costs or lack of alternative employment at the same
wage.  For instance, employed labor might earn a premium over the alternatives of early
retirement or unemployment compensation.  We assume the loss suffered by labor from being
laid off equals a fraction η of the current wage, w.  Thus, if the workforce adjusts to the optimal
level at t 1 in response to a drop in demand for the widget, the loss to labor amounts to
η α   wK K hl ()  (in terms of t 2 values).  Note that, in a competitive labor market, η would
equal zero—labor loses nothing from being laid off.  In competitive markets, labor would be fully
insured against losses in income either through unemployment insurance or, as approximated by
the United States, through a robust job market in which laid-off workers quickly find new jobs“Corporate Governance, Entrenched Labor, and Economic Growth” – November 8, 2001
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paying the worker’s marginal product.  Labor has no use for bargaining power in a competitive
market, so it is no surprise that the United States has neither codetermination nor entrenched
labor.
The value at t 2 of labor income lost by being laid off, η α   wK K hl () , is the
maximum amount labor can credibly bargaining over.  The value at t 2 of net income (income in
excess of opportunity cost of capital) to the firm is κ ⋅⋅ r Kl, which puts a limit on the amount
labor can extract from shareholders.  Thus, the maximum amount labor can gain from bargaining
at t 1 (expressed in terms of t 2 values) is:
Min{  ,  ( )} κ η α      rK w K K lh l .
Note that this amount might not be enough to maintain the workforce at the high-demand level in
a second-period low-demand state.  All else equal, the more profitable a project is (the higher κ
is), the more likely labor can extract a sufficient amount from shareholders to keep all workers
employed.  At the same time, the more profitable a project is, the more likely the shareholders’
second-period net income will not be exhausted by wage payments.
In the case where labor has (some or all) bargaining power and demand is high in the first
period, running the firm at large scale during the first period is not necessarily optimal.  To see
this, consider what will happen if demand drops to the low level in the second period.  Labor will
use its bargaining power to extract part or all of the firm’s second-period net income, κ ⋅⋅ r Kl
(expressed in t 2 terms).
Suppose the firm is a listed stock corporation whose investors are diversified and who
make investment decisions in a risk-neutral manner.  This means that the shareholders simply
maximize expected final (t 2) wealth.  Let π  be the probability that demand falls to the low level
during the second period.  The value added during the first period is invested outside the firm at“Corporate Governance, Entrenched Labor, and Economic Growth” – November 8, 2001
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the opportunity cost, r.  If shareholders choose to operate at small scale during the first period,
their expected final wealth at t 2 will be:
EW r K r r K K r
hl
lh l [ ] ( 1) ( 1) +( ) ( 1)
,        κ
       π κ [ ( 1 )( 1 ) + ( 1 +)( ) ] rK r K K lh l
   (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) π κ rK h,
where the shareholders’ wealth at the outset is Kh.  If, on the other hand, shareholders choose to
operate at large scale during the first period, their expected final wealth (at t 2) is:
EW r K r
hh
h [] ( 1 ) ( 1 )
,    κ
+ [(1+ ) (1 ) +(1 ) ( )] π κ     rK r K K lh l
     π κ η α Min{  ,  ( )} rK w K K lh l
   (1 ) (1 ) (1 ) π κ rK h.
The difference in expected final wealth between operating the firm at small scale and
large scale, respectively, is:
EW EW r K K r
hl hh
hl [] [] ( ) ( 1 )
,,        κ
     π κ η α Min{  ,  ( )} rK w K K lh l
Clearly, the shareholders will underinvest in the first period—i.e., choose to run the project at
small scale in spite of high first-period demand—if (and only if) EW EW
hl hh [] [] > 0
,,  .  On the
other hand, for EW EW
hl hh [] [] 0
,,  , the shareholders will operate during the first period at
large scale.  They then are faced with the risk (with probability π ) that the firm will be“Corporate Governance, Entrenched Labor, and Economic Growth” – November 8, 2001
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hl .  These
considerations lead to the following two testable hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1
Codetermined firms tend to underinvest.
Hypothesis 2
Codetermined firms tend to be overstaffed.
We provide numerical examples in the next section to illustrate the general conclusions
stated here.  The following section discusses empirical evidence that bears on these questions.
NUMERICAL EXAMPLES
The examples illustrate the firm’s choice of investment scale at t 0, the beginning of the
first period, in the case of high first-period demand; the case of low first-period demand is trivial.
We assume the following values: K K r w h l == = = == 100; 80; 0.1; 0.2; 0.25; 1; η α
π = 0.5.  We consider in turn high and low values for the profitability of the project:
κ  0.1 or 0.3.
For low profitability (κ  0.1), the difference in expected final wealth between running
the project at small scale and running it at large scale during the first period equals:
EW EW
hl hh [ ]- [ ] 0.22 0.5 Min{0.8;1}= 0.18
,, =− + ⋅
Clearly, the firm will choose to run the project at small scale, which implies underinvestment in
the first period by the amount K K h l −= 20.  There is no overstaffing during the second period,
because no layoffs ever would be needed.  The loss to the shareholders (valued at t 2)—which
also is the loss in social welfare—amounts to κ ⋅⋅ − = r K K h l () 0 . 2 .“Corporate Governance, Entrenched Labor, and Economic Growth” – November 8, 2001
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If on the other hand the profitability of the project is high (κ  0.3), the difference in
expected final wealth resulting from small-scale operation during the first period instead of
large-scale operation is:
EW EW
hl hh [ ] [ ] 0.66 0.5 Min{2.4;1}= 0.16
,,     
In this high-profitability case, the firm chooses to run the project at large scale during the
first period despite the existence of entrenched labor and the rational expectation of a hold-up
problem if second-period demand is low.  No underinvestment occurs, but the firm is overstaffed
on average during the second period.  There are no layoffs; the firm operates with the maximum
amount of excess labor because its operations are highly profitable.  The loss to the shareholders
(valued at t 2) equals w K K h l ⋅⋅ − = α () 5 .  There is no loss to society, because the wealth
extracted by labor comes from shareholders (i.e., it is producer surplus).
The two foregoing examples illustrate cases of underinvestment and overstaffing,
respectively.  Underinvestment always creates a loss to society, while overstaffing never does.
Overstaffing is simply a wealth transfer from the shareholders to labor and has no efficiency
implications.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
Gorton and Schmid (2000) show that equal representation, when compared to one-third
representation, reduces stock market (i.e., equity) value by 27 percent.  Using a different
methodology and a different sample, FitzRoy and Kraft (1993) found in an early study that equal
representation depresses a typical firm’s value added by 19.7 percent.
 1  These studies indicate
that equal representation places a drag on the performance of German corporations.  Removing
equal representation requirements presumably would add value.“Corporate Governance, Entrenched Labor, and Economic Growth” – November 8, 2001
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Overstaffing
Little evidence has been presented to date that explains the reasons why equal
representation (in comparison to one-third representation) depresses corporate performance.  A
1998 report by the bipartisan Codetermination Committee (Kommission Mitbestimmung) offers
insights into how labor uses its power, and how this might affect firms’ performance.  One of the
topics highlighted by the report is the so-called employment-preserving role of codetermination
(Chapter 6, Section 25).  In order to preserve its influence on the firm, labor seeks to maintain a
high share in total input costs.
Table 1 presents regression results that shed light on the impact of equal representation
(compared to one-third representation) on wages and employment at the firm level.  These
previously unpublished results use the data set from Gorton and Schmid (2000).  This data set
comprises the 250 largest traded German corporations at the end of 1993, covering the period
1989-1993.  About half the companies in the data set are subject to equal representation, while the
remainder have one-third representation.
[Table 1]
The regression results do not support the hypothesis that the average wage at companies
with equal representation is higher than at companies with one-third representation (Table 1,
column 1).  This is in line with the separation of codetermination and collective wage bargaining
documented in Kommission Mitbestimmung (1998, chapter 7, section 6).  Given the absence of a
significant difference in average wage levels across codetermination regimes, the 42 percent
difference in the wage bill-to-sales ratio indicated in our second regression (Table 1, column 2)
therefore implies that companies with equal representation are overstaffed.  This 42 percent
difference in the wage bill corresponds to a 33 percent higher employee count when normalized
by sales (Table 1, column 3).“Corporate Governance, Entrenched Labor, and Economic Growth” – November 8, 2001
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Migration of business activity away from codetermined firms
A rational response by shareholders facing entrenched labor in codetermined firms in a
repeated game would be to shift business activity gradually to corporate and other business forms
subject to less intrusive legislation.  As Table 2 reports, precisely this has occurred in Germany
during recent decades.  The fraction of total private-sector employment accounted for by firms
subject to “twin codetermination”—both shop-level and supervisory board-level
codetermination—stood at 30.5 percent in 1984, according to the Kommission Mitbestimmung.
By the mid-1990s, this fraction had shrunk to 24.5 percent.  Conversely, the fraction of total
private employment in the “codetermination-free zone” of the economy increased from 50.6
percent to 60.5 percent.  A similar pattern played out across the economy as a whole, as panel B
of Table 2 confirms.
[Table 2]
Cross-border acquisitions are a way of watering down the effects of codetermination and
thereby increasing the value of the firm.  As Kommission Mitbestimmung (1998, Chapter 6,
Section 23, Paragraph 7) reports, coordination problems among the labor representatives of the
various subsidiaries and the top tier (the parent firm) within groups of firms (concerns)
substantially weaken the power of labor.  Thus, German corporations may be attractive
cross-border takeover targets if for no other reason than the potential to release latent value that is
pent up by codetermination-driven overstaffing.  The merger of Hoechst AG of Germany and
Rhône-Poulenc S.A. of France into Aventis S.A. in December 1999 is a case in point.  Aventis
S.A. is headquartered in Strasbourg, France.  While the German subsidiary, Hoechst AG, is still
subject to equal representation, top-tier decision-making happens at Aventis S.A., which is out of
the reach of German codetermination laws.“Corporate Governance, Entrenched Labor, and Economic Growth” – November 8, 2001
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A final strand of evidence regarding the deleterious effects of entrenched labor on
economic performance comes from aggregate output statistics.  While it might appear heroic to
assert a single cause of differences in growth rates across countries, it is noteworthy that growth
rates of real GDP slowed substantially in Germany after the enactment of the 1976
Codetermination Act.  Figure 2 shows that, during the period 1960-1975, real GDP in Germany
and the United States grew at nearly the same average annual rate.  Germany grew during this
period at an annual rate of 3.46 percent, while the United States grew at an annual rate of 3.44
percent.  During the period 1976-1989—which ends before the German reunification in 1990—
the United States grew at an annual rate of 3.08 percent while Germany grew at an average rate of
only 2.00 percent.  After a temporary pickup in growth in the wake of reunification, Germany
slipped back onto a growth path that falls short of U.S. growth by a wide margin.
[Figure 2]
Taken together, these disparate pieces of evidence are consistent with the hypotheses that
codetermination increases labor entrenchment; entrenchment induces shareholder responses; and
employer adjustments to entrenched labor may exert a significant drag on economic growth.
These adjustments include underinvestment and avoidance of corporate forms subject to
restrictive codetermination laws, both of which are likely to reduce an economy’s growth
potential.
CONCLUSIONS
The German corporate governance environment is unusual in several ways.  The system
of codetermination is an important fact of German corporate life that is both well established and
likely to elicit responses from shareholders.  Our simple two-period model of investment and
employment highlights the potential for entrenched labor to exert meaningful effects on firm
decision-making.  In particular, codetermined firms can be expected on average to underinvest“Corporate Governance, Entrenched Labor, and Economic Growth” – November 8, 2001
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relative to the levels that otherwise would be observed, and one would expect them to be
overstaffed on average.  We provide new empirical evidence that demonstrates the second of
these predictions.  The end result of entrenched labor may be to reduce the long-run growth
potential of the German economy.“Corporate Governance, Entrenched Labor, and Economic Growth” – November 8, 2001
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1  Let β be the regression coefficient of a 0/1 variable, then the change in the dependent variable
as a result of a switch of this indicator variable from zero to one amounts to: e
β 1.  For details
see Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980).  Based on the regression coefficients presented by FitzRoy
and Kraft (1993, Table 2), the aforementioned decrease of 19.7% is thus calculated as follows:
ee 0.13 0.06 − − .“Corporate Governance, Entrenched Labor, and Economic Growth” – November 8, 2001
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Table 1
Employment, compensation, and equal representation.  The data set comprises the largest 250 traded
German corporations by assets as of end of fiscal year 1993.  Observations are from the period 1989-1993.
Subsidiaries are not consolidated.  The panel is unbalanced due to missing observations.  For details on the
data set see Gorton and Schmid (2000).  The wage bill is in 1991 Deutsche marks and includes pension
contributions.  Sales are in 1991 Deutsche marks.  Numbers of employees generally are as of end of fiscal
year; for a few companies it is fiscal-year averages.  Equal representation: Equal to 1 if there is equal
representation on the supervisory board, 0 otherwise.  Firm size: (Log of) stock market capitalization (as of
the end of the calendar year that ends before the respective fiscal year).  Insiders: Fraction of equity control
rights held by management, other employees, or families.  Banks: Fraction of equity control rights held by
domestic banks.  Government:  Fraction of equity control rights held by domestic government entities.
Largest shareholder:  Maximum fraction of equity control rights held by a single shareholder.
ISIC: Industry affiliation based on International Standard Industrial Classification (United Nations, 1990)
where category D (manufacturing) serves as the numeraire industry.  Sample years are represented by
indicator variables where 1993 serves as the numeraire year.  Standard errors are corrected following
Newey-West (1987); t-statistics significance levels (in two-tailed tests): * denotes 10% level, ** denotes
5% level, and *** denotes 1% level.  The effect of equal representation is the product of the regression
coefficient of the interaction term Equal representation × Firm size (if significant), and the median value of
firm size in the sub-sample of companies with equal representation.
Dependent Variable
(1)
Log Ratio of Wage Bill to
Number of Employees
(2)
Log Ratio of Wage Bill to
Sales
(3)
Log Ratio of Number of
Employees to Sales
Explanatory Variable Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic
Equal representation × Firm size 3.772 ⋅ 10
-3 1.030 2.039 ⋅ 10
-2 4.495*** 1.592 ⋅ 10
-2 3.361***
Firm size 1.078 ⋅ 10
-1 4.543*** 1.157 ⋅ 10
-2 0.295 -4.527 ⋅ 10
-2 -1.089
Insiders 1.765 ⋅ 10
-2 0.146 1.782 ⋅ 10
-1 1.238 1.837 ⋅ 10
-1 1.289
Banks 4.919 ⋅ 10
-2 0.223 7.639 ⋅ 10
-1 2.135** 6.686 ⋅ 10
-1 2.875***
Government -1.574 ⋅ 10
-2 -0.208 -4.738 ⋅ 10
-2 -0.315 -1.091 ⋅ 10
-1 -0.652
Largest shareholder 6.925 ⋅ 10
-2 0.598 5.646 ⋅ 10
-2 0.356 -8.581 ⋅ 10
-2 -0.498
ISIC A -3.456 ⋅ 10
-2 -0.480 1.889 ⋅ 10
-1 1.758* 1.842 ⋅ 10
-1 1.915*
ISIC C 1.159 ⋅ 10
-1 1.366 7.226 ⋅ 10
-1 4.402*** 6.234 ⋅ 10
-1 3.317***
ISIC E 1.658 ⋅ 10
-1 2.659*** -3.968 ⋅ 10
-1 -3.939*** -5.684 ⋅ 10
-1 -5.241***
ISIC F -1.591 ⋅ 10
-1 -1.273 6.362 ⋅ 10
-3 0.073 6.965 ⋅ 10
-2 0.596
ISIC G -2.425 ⋅ 10
-1 -2.180** -6.724 ⋅ 10
-1 -5.131*** -3.145 ⋅ 10
-1 -2.631***
ISIC H -4.533 ⋅ 10
-1 -5.605*** 6.518 ⋅ 10
-1 4.944*** 1.114 9.690***
ISIC I 4.554 ⋅ 10
-2 0.788 -7.177 ⋅ 10
-2 -0.317 -1.556 ⋅ 10
-1 -0.703
ISIC K 3.260 ⋅ 10
-1 3.451*** -1.669 ⋅ 10
-1 -0.406 -4.593 ⋅ 10
-1 -1.250
ISIC N -2.314 ⋅ 10
-1 -2.891*** 5.998 ⋅ 10
-1 5.274*** 7.200 ⋅ 10
-1 6.438***
1992 -9.095 ⋅ 10
-2 -2.179** -1.346 ⋅ 10
-2 -0.176 5.580 ⋅ 10
-2 0.729
1991 -2.382 ⋅ 10
-1 -3.712*** 3.038 ⋅ 10
-2 0.407 1.710 ⋅ 10
-1 2.319**
1990 -3.004 ⋅ 10
-1 -4.181*** -8.384 ⋅ 10
-3 -0.084 1.992 ⋅ 10
-1 1.986**
1989 -3.251 ⋅ 10
-1 -4.667*** -5.871 ⋅ 10
-2 -0.682 1.461 ⋅ 10
-1 1.705*
Constant 2.308 5.091*** -1.939 -2.580*** -5.112 -6.402***
F-statistic 5.740*** 7.987*** 7.568***
R
2 adj. 0.093 0.139 0.134
Effect of equal representation --- 0.420 0.328
Number of observations 858 798 783“Corporate Governance, Entrenched Labor, and Economic Growth” – November 8, 2001
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Table 2
Fraction of employees by codetermination type.  Employees fall into the category of so-called
twin codetermination if their employers have both works councils (codetermination on the
shop-floor level) and equal representation on the supervisory board.  Equal representation on the
supervisory board may result from the 1951 Montan Codetermination Act or the 1976
Codetermination Act.  Employees are assigned to the so-called single codetermination regime if
their employers have works councils but are not subject to equal representation on the supervisory
board.  Companies without equal representation on the supervisory board may be subject to 1/3
codetermination according to the 1976 Codetermination Act or have no labor representation on
the supervisory board.  Employees are assigned to a regime of no codetermination if their
employers have neither works councils nor equal representation on the supervisory board.  The
public sector generally has representation on the shop-floor level, but supervisory boards do not
exist.  Media companies and many nonprofit organizations are exempt from codetermination due
to the constitutional freedoms of expression and faith.  The terms twin and single codetermination
were taken from Kommission Mitbestimmung (1998), who compiled the numbers.  Kommission
Mitbestimmung calculated the numbers from data that originate from multiple sources and years,
which explains the choice of the reference year 1994/96.
Percentage Fractions of Employees by Codetermination Type
Panel A: Private Sector
Codetermination Type 1984 1994/96
Twin Codetermination 30.5 24.5
Single Codetermination 18.9 15.0
No Codetermination 50.6 60.5
Total (Percent) 100 100
Panel B: Whole Economy (Private, Public, and Nonprofit Sectors)
Codetermination Type 1984 1994/96
Twin Codetermination 22.2 18.2
Single Codetermination 40.8 36.9
No Codetermination 37.0 44.9
Total (Percent) 100 100“Corporate Governance, Entrenched Labor, and Economic Growth” – November 8, 2001
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Figure 1
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Figure 2
























































































Real GDP:  annual observations; United States: GDP in billions of chained 1996 US$; Germany: GDP
at constant prices (1995=100); rebased to 100 in 1960; Source: IMF.